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Abstract: Collaborative environmental governance is a prominent approach to natural resource governance 
in New Zealand. It is emerging in the Land and Water Forum, Canterbury Water Management Strategy, and 
the proposed Resource Legislation Amendment Bill. This article reviews political and economic theory to ask 
if collaboration is good for the environment in the context of the Land and Water Forum. Interest group and 
public choice theories offer cogent reasons for pessimism. Elinor Ostrom’s and Guy Salmon’s models offer 
reasons for optimism. I conclude that the most pertinent parts of Ostrom’s model for New Zealand are her 
caveats. Her model applies to closed systems, not open systems such as rivers with down-stream effects like 
nitrate E. coli contamination. In open ecological systems, pessimism about local collaborative environmental 
governance is warranted unless decisions are shackled to strong and unambiguous national regulation. Without 
strong regulation, collaborative governance creates systems in which those not invited into the collaborative 
deliberation do not count. In natural resource governance, this dynamic will favour resource development interests 
over conservation. I conclude that collaborative environmental governance risks being less than democratic, 
less than fair, and less than good for the environment. 
Not surprisingly, optimists and pessimists would view the Land and Water Forum differently. Optimists 
would say that it is an incomplete application of a promising model. Unfortunately, ecological outcomes data 
to settle the question are rarely collected internationally and do not exist yet in New Zealand. Pessimists would 
say it was doomed from the start by power imbalances, displaced and subjugated environmental goals, and a 
fundamental lack of democracy. Such pessimists might say Fish and Game was wise to pull out in November 
2015, but would have been wiser to pull out sooner.
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Introduction
Collaborative environmental governance is becoming a 
fashionable approach to the governance of environmental 
resources in New Zealand. In recent years we have seen it 
emerge in the Land and Water Forum (LAWF), the Taupo 
Catchment, the Mackenzie Agreement, and the Canterbury 
Water Management Strategy, among others (Rennie 2010). 
The proposed Resource Legislation Amendment Bill increases 
the scope of collaborative planning because it, ‘encourages 
greater front-end public engagement, which will produce plans 
that better reflect community values and will thereby reduce 
litigation costs and lengthy delays.’ (Resource Legislation 
Amendment Bill 2016, Explanatory Note).
Collaborative governance, ‘combines the concepts of: 
[1] Collaboration: … to co-operate to achieve common goals. 
… Co-operation is based on the value of reciprocity. [2] 
Governance: To steer the process that influences decisions and 
actions within the private, public, and civic sectors. Although 
government plays a role in governance, it is not the only player.’ 
(Eppel 2013, p. 27).
Collaborative environmental governance has become a 
well-studied alternative to top-down regulation of a central 
authority, with a growing literature in the environmental studies 
community, as well as in political science and economics. 
Many herald collaborative environmental governance as 
delivering outcomes which are more democratic, less overtly 
political, and better for the environment than traditional top-
down governance (see for example Kemmis 1990; Sirmon et 
al. 1993; Duane 1997; Wondolleck & Yaffee 2000; Lawrence 
et al. 2001; Weber 2003; Leach 2006; McGuire 2006; Miller 
& Fox 2007). In situations where different interests define 
the problem differently, or deny it completely, collaborative 
governance can encompass the disagreement and harness 
it towards a common solution (Eppel 2013). Collaboration 
appeals to competing interests: to business interests it offers 
more flexible and cheaper regulations than centralised 
legislation; to divided local communities it offers greater 
awareness, understanding, and peace while arriving at some 
form of economic sustainability (Klyza & Sousa 2008); and to 
battle-worn environmentalists it offers environmental outcomes 
that are as good or better than top-down regulation and less 
painful to achieve (Wondolleck & Yaffee 2000). Indeed Elinor 
Ostrom (1990, 1998, 2009) theorised and observed that, under 
the right conditions, local collaborative governance of a shared 
resource can work socially and environmentally. 
Ansell and Gash (2007) noted that many believe 
collaborative governance offers at least three improvements 
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over previous models: (1) it will expand democratic 
participation in local affairs, enhance democracy, and thereby 
create a sense of shared ownership of larger and more complex 
problems (e.g. Bryan 2004); (2) it will make public management 
more rational, by getting the politics out of the way of good 
management; and (3) it will reduce cost, presumably making 
the environmental dollar go further. However, the ability of 
collaborative governance to live up to these promises has been 
little explored. Research has rarely focused on environmental 
outcomes (Yaffee & Wondolleck 2003; Koontz & Thomas 
2006; Ansell & Gash 2007; Thomas 2008), so it is difficult 
to say whether it has yielded better or worse results for the 
environment than its managerial and adversarial predecessors. 
Furthermore, many US environmental groups are notably 
sceptical about collaborative governance because they feel 
that it is advantageous to industry groups, and that it abdicates 
federal responsibility, circumvents environmental laws, leads 
to ‘lowest-common-denominator’ solutions, is not accountable 
to public and scientific review processes, and is undemocratic 
(McCloskey 1999a, b). Their concerns that collaboration can 
work socially, but not environmentally, find support in public 
choice theory, the rational actor model of politics (e.g. Downs 
1957; Mueller 2003), and the neopluralist school of political 
science (MacFarland 2004). 
Thus, political and economic theory and observation 
provide reasons for both optimism and pessimism about what 
collaborative governance has to offer the environment. This 
paper reviews those reasons within the context of the LAWF 
and considers what collaborative governance may offer for 
the environment in New Zealand. 
Reasons for pessimism
Political science and economics provide four reasons for 
pessimism about collaborative environmental governance. 
Interest group theory predicts it will be undemocratic; public 
choice theory predicts it will favour resource development 
over the environment; and displacement theory predicts it will 
avoid measuring environmental outcomes and bar participants 
from appealing unsatisfactory outcomes.
Pessimism 1. Collaboration is undemocratic
Interest group theory presents three challenges to the idea that 
replacing managerial or adversarial top-down leadership with 
collaborative community leadership enhances democracy. 
First, by sharing the authority vested in government by voters, 
collaborative governance would appear to risk undermining 
the authority of the voting process. Theodore Lowi said of 
collaborative environmental governance: ‘the motivation is 
… to try to finesse the coercive nature of public authority … 
[and] pretend away public authority’ (Lowi 1999, p. 17–18). 
The advance of delegated and collaborative authority means 
the decline of public authority, public accountability, and the 
rule of law (Lowi 1969). A ‘broad delegation of power’ from 
an elected body such as congress, parliament, or a territorial 
authority is what Lowi called famously ‘policy without law’ 
(Lowi 1969, p. 126). Policy without law could still adhere 
to principles of democratic accountability if the delegated 
authority were ‘given the power to be flexible, but it was 
relatively well shackled by clear standards of public policy, as 
stated in the statute and as understood in common law’ (Lowi 
1969, p. 131). A grant of broad and unshackled powers away 
from elected authorities is but an ‘imposition of impotence’ 
upon the elected authorities and the voters who elected them 
(Lowi 1969, p. 156). 
Second, in practice, collaborative governance appears to 
disempower certain types of groups almost systematically. 
Any group will develop imbalances of power, but some types 
of constituencies are more likely to be powerless than others 
(English 2000). A national, disorganised, geographically 
dispersed, or otherwise diffuse constituency is likely to be 
comparatively disadvantaged to those that are more organised, 
local, and concentrated (Rogers et al. 1993; Buanes et al. 2004). 
Further, a group with a vested financial interest is likely to 
be more organised and thus more successful than the public 
interest groups (Olson 1965). This disadvantage lies at the 
heart of criticisms that local collaboration is not accountable 
to national interests (McCloskey 1999a, b; Manring 2005). 
Conservation and environmental groups are often in the 
category of disadvantaged national interests (like the Royal 
Forest and Bird Society (‘Forest and Bird’) or Fish and Game 
Councils of NZ (‘Fish and Game’)); while development-
oriented groups (like the Hurunui Water Project, proponents 
of a North Canterbury irrigation scheme) are often vested, 
local, organised, and concentrated.
Third, though the managerialism of scientific management 
and the adversarialism of command and control each had its 
problems, they also each had the advantage of giving the 
public the means to express their concerns about technical 
problems. When legislators, judges, ministries, or territorial 
authorities make decisions for the public, they might favour 
those with the technical wherewithal to participate in detailed 
discussions (Merkhofer et al.1997; Day et al. 2003; Lasker & 
Weiss 2003; Murdock et al. 2005; Warner 2006). Similarly, not 
all interested parties have the time to participate in collaborative 
efforts, as many have full-time employment, family, and 
personal commitments (Yaffee & Wondolleck 2003). Finally, 
a form of democracy that is more direct and participatory can 
systematically disadvantage certain constituencies, such as the 
less eloquent and less educated. Hibbing and Thiess-Morse 
(2002, p. 203) comment ‘[t]he chorus in the interest-group 
pluralism [representative democracy by voting] heaven 
may sing with a decidedly upper-class accent, but in direct 
deliberation [direct democracy by collaborative participation] 
heaven it sings with a decidedly white, male, educated, 
confident, blowhard accent’. Though scholars have offered 
remedies for these and other pitfalls (see Ansell & Gash 2007, 
p. 9–10 for a summary), diminishing the power of voting and 
appeals risks circumventing democracy in favour of efficiency.
Pessimism 2. Collaboration favours development over 
the environment
Although participants may enter collaboration with the 
expectation of a fair and desirable result, interest group and 
public choice theories predict that the development interest 
will wield greater power than the environmental interest in 
collaborative governance efforts (Olson 1965). Several studies 
have observed this outcome (McCloskey 1999a, b; Echeverria 
2001; Schuckman 2001). When interest groups get to negotiate 
the meaning of legislation (environmental or otherwise), the 
outcome will often benefit corporate and development interests 
at the expense of the public interest, however nebulous that 
might be (Klyza & Sousa 2008). 
Pessimism 3. Collaboration goals will be displaced
Social theory predicts several forms of displacement behaviour 
might arise in collaborative environmental governance when 
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‘the organisational means [such as collaboration] become 
transformed into ends-in-themselves and displace the principal 
goals…’ (Merton 1957). This taking one’s eyes off the prize 
has the potential to exacerbate the power imbalances predicted 
above. 
A first manifestation of displacement behaviour has been 
noted by Ansell and Gash (2007), that success is primarily 
measured on stakeholder perception of good faith negotiation, 
consensus, and satisfaction with process, rather than ecological 
outcome. Indeed this might be the goal. The primary outcomes 
desired from collaboration on an environmental problem 
are things like citizen engagement (Stivers 1990), social 
empowerment, opposition appeasement, or maintaining the 
status quo (Stone 2001). These outcomes have little to do with 
environmental problems like water quality or species numbers 
(Brower et al. 2001; Ansell & Gash 2007). 
Indeed, although such procedural displacement behaviour 
is detrimental to environmental goals (Brower et al. 2001), 
many observe that it appears essential to the progress of 
collaboration among antagonistic stakeholders (Ansell & Gash 
2007). Ironically, the survival of collaborative environmental 
governance may therefore rely on displacement behaviour 
and avoiding the measurement of environmental outcomes. 
Pessimism 4. Collaboration forces participants to uphold 
decisions regardless of outcome 
The final manifestation of displacement behaviour is in 
the effect of collaborative governance on the process of 
appealing a decision once made. It has often been observed 
that collaboration tends to favour the status quo over change 
(e.g. Stone 2001). Although collaborative and adaptive 
management are often mentioned in the same breath, the 
displacement behaviour exhibited by the former renders the 
latter functionally impossible. This commitment to uphold the 
decision regardless of the outcome is a necessary component 
for successful collaboration (Ansell & Gash 2007). Hence 
participants must agree from the outset to be willing to sacrifice 
their ultimate environmental goal in the name of collaboration.
Ansell and Gash (2007) observe that this willingness to 
sacrifice self-interest in pursuit of a common good is sometimes 
construed as selfless altruism of participants. This so-called 
altruism risks giving the impression that the default position of 
development interests overpowering environmental interests 
is fair and unbiased, and that a collective Ouija board effort 
of all participants pushing with equal and opposing forces 
will produce fair and unbiased outcomes. Although there 
are exceptions, the public choice and interest group theories 
described above predict that private and public interests are 
opposing, but rarely equal, forces in the same way that hens in 
a henhouse are an opposing, but not equal, force to the foxes 
that fancy eating them. 
Pessimism proposition
In light of the evidence above, I offer a pessimism proposition 
that:
A confluence of political, economic and social theories 
predicts that collaborative governance will produce 
outcomes that are: (1) undemocratic; (2) biased towards 
development over the environment; and dependent on (3) 
a lack of ecological measurement and (4) an inability to 
appeal decisions.
Reasons for optimism
Ostrom’s work offers reasons for optimism about collaborative 
environmental governance. Ostrom (1990, 1998) proposes that 
individuals can cooperate for collective and long-term benefit. 
In many ways, her work was a response to the abject pessimism 
of the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ narrative (Hardin 1968), 
which resembles closely Olson’s (1965) Logic of Collective 
Action, in which resources held in common are destined to 
be over-used and therefore should be privatised. It is often 
forgotten that Hardin and Olson offered another solution – 
mutually agreed upon coercion (which we know as regulation). 
Ostrom’s common-pool resource ownership offers a third way 
out of Hardin’s Tragedy: under the right conditions, admittedly 
self-interested individuals can cooperate and act altruistically 
in common-pool ownership, in the long-term interest of the 
community, not just the individual (Ostrom 1990, 1998).
The idea of common-pool ownership of a resource and its 
problems is to empower those affected by it to take ownership 
of the problem, manage its causes, and mitigate its effects. The 
underlying logic is that those affected by the problem have 
the most knowledge of it and are most motivated to manage 
and mitigate it for the benefit of all in the long term (Ostrom 
1990). Parties affected include those who benefit from a 
resource held in common, like water users, and those harmed 
by its diminution. In other words, common pool ownership 
of a resource extends ownership rights to the beneficiaries.
Ostrom (1990) proposes eight principles for the successful 
governance of common-pool resources that might apply to 
collaborative environmental governance. These principles 
provide three reasons for optimism: (1) collaboration will be 
democratic and accountable if arranged and accessible across 
multiple levels; (2) collaboration relies on monitoring and 
enforcement by resource users themselves, not on avoiding 
measurement; and (3) collaboration leads to sustainable 
resource use instead of exploitative development.
Optimism 1. Collaboration will be democratic and 
accountable
Advocates of collaboration cite its democratic ideals including 
inclusiveness, representativeness, impartiality, transparency, 
lawfulness and empowerment (Leach 2006). According to 
Ostrom’s model, collaborative environmental governance will 
be democratic and accountable if it is ‘nested’ within sets of rules 
at the local, regional, national and even international levels. 
This multi-level, nested approach enhances accountability, 
fairness and democracy (Ostrom 1990). Local interests must 
demonstrate that they operate within national rules, policies, 
and natural resource plans (Ostrom 1990). This appears similar 
to Lowi’s ‘shackles’ (see Pessimism 1 above) and appears to 
address concerns about the accountability of collaborative 
governance to a National Policy Statement or National 
Objectives Framework under the Resource Management Act 
1991, for example. 
To put things in a different context, Schattschneider (1964) 
describes three classes of participants in political contests – 
public, private, and special interests. A public interest is a goal 
or good shared by all in the community, like drinking water 
quality. A private interest is shared by just a few, but does 
generate some public benefit (such as lake-based recreation 
opportunities from a private irrigation project). A special 
interest benefits just a few, with no public benefits. 
If a resource-dependent community develops its own 
self-generated legitimacy through mutual trust, norms of 
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reciprocity among community members, and an importance 
of reputation among members, decisions about allocation of 
that common-pool resource can be fair to all those affected 
within the community and sustainable over time. This trust, 
reciprocity, and reputation translates into ‘quasi-voluntary’ 
compliance with rules developed within the community to 
regulate, monitor, and enforce fair resource distribution (see 
Ostrom 1990). Thus, a successful pattern of collaborative 
decisions about allocation of a resource depends on ‘the 
contingent nature of a commitment to comply with rules’ 
(Ostrom 1990). Similarly, Ellickson (1994) observed that 
small and tightly knit groups of neighbouring land-owners 
develop norms to which they comply voluntarily because the 
norms benefit all insiders involved, and outsiders have no say 
in such internal norms.
Salmon et al. (2008) compared New Zealand’s efforts 
at collaborative environmental governance to those in the 
Nordic countries. Like Ostrom, they list ownership of and 
empowerment over an environmental issue or resource as 
prominent pre-requisites for a successful collaboration. 
They criticise New Zealand’s so-called collaborative effort, 
aborted after five years, to craft a National Policy Statement 
on freshwater for using stakeholders as reference groups and 
sounding boards instead of ‘consensus building forums [sic].’ 
This effort failed to extend bona-fide rights of ownership and 
control to those affected. Government officials retained separate 
decision-making authority rather than ensconcing themselves 
in a collaborative, shared ownership, decision-making system 
in the Nordic style (Salmon et al. 2008). This lack of genuine 
ownership likely stemmed from a lack of trust in those affected 
to do the right thing (Salmon et al. 2008). This lack of trust 
can then become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Granting genuine 
ownership of and authority over an environmental problem 
engenders trust among those affected, allowing them to, ‘work 
directly together to achieve an agreement on how agricultural 
impacts on the environment should be managed.’ (Salmon et 
al. 2008, p. 9).
Optimism 2. Collaboration is not dependent on avoiding 
ecological measurement, prohibiting appeals and displacing 
goals
Uncertainty in environmental decision-making underlies many 
governance problems (Dietz et al. 2003), but may be reduced 
over time through the successful mixing of scientific (formal) 
and local (informal) knowledge (Ostrom 1990). Therefore, in 
Ostrom’s (1990) approach, monitoring is ongoing, as is the 
sanctioning of non-conformity, albeit graduated so as not to 
be overly severe and discourage outright cooperation. Thus, 
a balance of rules and norms developed over time obviates 
costly litigation. Trust, reciprocity and reputation that evolve 
during monitoring and enforcement inspire the confidence 
‘that others are cooperating and the ruler [is providing] joint 
benefits, they [individuals] comply willingly with laws (rules)’ 
(Ostrom 1990, p. 95). 
In Ostrom’s model, resource-dependent communities 
themselves develop conflict-resolution mechanisms to 
determine what constitutes an infraction and how it should be 
punished (Ostrom 1990). Thus, participants need not forego 
the right of appeal. 
Optimism 3. Collaboration does not favour development 
over the environment in allocation decisions, but might in 
decisions about effects
Ostrom posits and observes that, in the right circumstances of 
reciprocity, trust and reputation, self-interested individuals can 
overcome short-term profit motivations and act in the long-
term communal interest of a common-pool resource. However, 
Ostrom focuses on sustained collective and collaborative use 
of a resource. Admittedly, it does not consider the effects of 
that resource use, felt by common-pool owners and outsiders 
alike, and externalities such as pollution are therefore not 
considered by those affected within a common pool resource 
system (Ostrom 1990). To combine Lowi and Ostrom, insiders 
might be ‘shackled’ to consider outsiders’ concerns at nested 
regional or national levels. Assigning ownership and access 
rights to a given resource pool neither accounts for nor controls 
external effects of resource use other than resource depletion.
The optimism proposition
Using a behavioural approach to rational choice theory, the 
work of Ostrom (1990, 1998, 2009) and others predicts that: 
Collaborative environmental governance will succeed if a 
positive feedback loop of trust, reciprocity and reputation is 
fostered by individuals associated with a natural resource. 
The positive feedback loop evolves in conjunction with 
a mixture of formal and informal checks and balances 
that define the ongoing governance arrangement for that 
particular resource pool. This improves the likelihood of 
successful collaboration between individuals with property 
interests in a common-pool resource.
Discussion – optimism, pessimism, and the 
Land and Water Forum
It is timely to ask questions about the prospects for 
collaborative environmental governance in New Zealand, 
because its environmental outcomes are largely untested yet. 
Most published descriptions focus on the positive, without 
considering the risks. Further, most studies measure social 
outcomes, without considering environmental ones. As if to 
exemplify this, the LAWF was declared ‘a successful attempt to 
solve an entrenched policy problem’ of contentious freshwater 
use after producing three reports in three years (Eppel 2013). 
This section examines that proclamation of success through 
the lens of the propositions developed above. 
The LAWF (Land and Water Forum, www.landandwater.
org.nz) grew out of a 2008 agreement among the Ministry for 
the Environment and farming and environmental interests 
to form the Sustainable Land Use Forum, bringing, ‘all 
stakeholders who had an interest in freshwater, including, 
crucially, iwi leaders, into the room.’ (Taylor 2013). In 2010, 
as the LAWF became institutionalised and formed a secretariat, 
the Government sent its draft National Policy Statement for 
Freshwater Management to the LAWF for response (Baines 
& O’Brien 2012). Hence the LAWF quickly became central 
to national freshwater policy-making. Its size and its centrality 
make it a powerful, if not representative, test case for the 
optimism and pessimism propositions.
The LAWF involves 68 organisations with interests in 
agriculture, water, and natural resources including recreation. 
As of early 2016, it had produced four reports. Those reports 
contain some 156 recommendations, of which the Government 
has picked up some in its now final 2011 National Policy 
Statement on Freshwater (Norris 2015). A core group of 21 
organisations has negotiated its way through the bulk of the 
policy work behind those recommendations. In early November 
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2015, six years into the collaborative project, one of New 
Zealand’s leading environmental and recreation advocates, 
Fish and Game, left the LAWF (Stewart 2015).
Insiders, outsiders, and those affected
The optimism proposition requires very particular definitions 
of those affected, particular boundaries of the system being 
governed, and particular relationships between proponents 
and opponents of resource development. Some of the media 
statements by and about Fish and Game’s departure from the 
LAWF suggest that those definitions either were not in place, 
or did not suit Fish and Game’s interests.
Collaborative governance is most robust when those 
dependent on a resource, or affected by its governance, can 
participate in modifying the rules governing resource use 
(Ostrom 1990). Democratic fairness in Ostrom’s model depends 
on the ability of those affected to exclude ‘outsiders’ by 
defining boundaries and access rights to the resource (Ostrom 
1990). In other words, those affected must have meaningful 
ownership and exclusive control of the resource and be nested 
within a system of regional and national interests (see design 
principle #8; Ostrom 1990). For this to work, these regional 
and nationally nested interests must be paying close attention 
and standing at the ready to mobilise (see design principle #7; 
Ostrom 1990). In short, the concerns of outsiders risk being 
ignored in the decisions made by those affected (Brower 2008). 
In the case of Fish and Game it seems that even insiders’ 
concerns can sometimes be overlooked. This is perhaps 
because collaboration changes relationships amongst 
political players, which has several potential consequences: 
(1) collaboration requires participants to cooperate, which 
changes the relationships between proponents and opponents 
of resource development; (2) this changed relationship strongly 
discourages opponents to appeal a decision, as that would 
violate the spirit of collaboration and so-called altruism, or be 
‘unhelpful’; and (3) it further creates a situation of dominance 
in which vested development interests keep their friends close 
and their enemies closer.
Indeed the enemies closer than friends dynamic of the 
collaborative LAWF process weakens, if not silences, the voice 
of any opposition to the collaborative decision. LAWF took 
pains to include all interests whose opposition posed a threat, 
and then forbade all participants (by definition all possible 
opponents) from criticizing the LAWF publicly. 
In 2012, a LAWF participant observed that it was crucial 
that the Forum’s ‘Small Group’ of decision-makers, ‘include 
all the people of the Plenary who could stop this dead; they 
had to be inside the tent.’ (a LAWF participant quoted in 
Baines & O’Brien 2012, p. 20). Further, on 11 February 
2015, the chair of LAWF issued a draft protocol of etiquette 
for participants, including a section prohibiting participants 
other than the chair from commenting publicly on proceedings 
or decisions (Bisley 2015). Resembling the NZ Cabinet’s 
Doctrine of Collective Responsibility, this all but silences 
potential political opposition. By prohibiting both after-the-fact 
appeals and during-the-process dissent from all participants, 
the LAWF exceeds the fourth pessimism proposition by a 
significant margin. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, Fish and Game found it hard 
to fulfil its statutory mandate to protect access to freshwater 
resources while adhering to the protocols for LAWF 
participants. Upon leaving the LAWF, Fish and Game Chief 
Executive Bryce Johnson commented, ‘when you sit down 
at the table with Irrigation NZ, the question isn’t ‘will there 
be water for irrigation?’ but it becomes a given of where and 
when and how. It limits your ability to advocate for water. The 
process is more superficial than substantial. For industry, it 
is ideal to have all the environmental groups neatly corralled 
inside the tent.’ (Johnson quoted in Stewart 2015, p. 6). 
One letter to a newspaper editor described it more pointedly, 
‘The Forum was yet another cynical ploy to ring-fence and 
emasculate reasoned opposition.’ (O’Connor 2015, p. 8). In 
attempting to refute these claims, the Government inadvertently 
affirmed them in Parliamentary Question Time, saying 
participation in the collaborative forum, ‘requires commitment 
in good faith towards other participants.’ (Hon Nathan Guy, 
Minister for Primary Industries; New Zealand Parliament 
2015). Further Hon Mr Guy demonstrated displacement 
behaviour by describing reports as measures of success (New 
Zealand Parliament 2015).
Further to the insiders and outsiders, the Ostrom-reliant 
optimism proposition assumes a closed system, in which there 
are no effects on outsiders. If the system is not closed, Ostrom’s 
design principle #1 allows those affected to close it, by defining 
boundaries and ownership. Such a model might work well for 
allocating water quantity in a closed system of neighbours who 
have shared ownership of a pond. However, it would be less 
effective at managing water quality in the same system where 
non-owners are affected. In sum, optimism is most warranted 
where it is appropriate to consider the desires of those living 
closest to the resource, to the exclusion of everyone else. This 
local definition of those affected fails to suit the interests of 
a national organisation like Fish and Game. Indeed when Dr 
Ostrom visited New Zealand in January 2011, I asked her if her 
model works for rivers. She said no, categorically (E. Ostrom 
pers. comm.). It works for smaller, more closed systems, but 
large open systems are more problematic for two reasons. First, 
in a small closed system it is safe to assume that downstream 
effects do not exist, or that those affected by downstream effects 
have neither an interest nor a say in the decisions. Second, in 
a large, open system like the Hurunui River or the Mackenzie 
Basin, there are substantive downstream effects that urbanites, 
North Islanders, and foreign tourists care very much about. 
Because few closed systems exist in a globalised economy, 
the poor fit of Ostrom’s model to open systems does not 
bode well for the environmental outcomes of collaborative 
environmental governance attempts in New Zealand. Indeed 
the pessimism proposition is consistent with many studies in 
political science and economics (Wilson 1989). In the end, 
Fish and Game came to the same conclusion, with its Chief 
Executive writing, ‘So, while collaboration sounds very 
nice, the reality is that it is a dressed up process predicated 
on compromise.  Even worse is that everything is hidden 
from the public and conducted behind closed doors. Forum 
participants don’t get meeting minutes.  The process is great 
for vested interests seeking private commercial use of some 
public natural resource such as water.  But it is a losing game 
for anyone wanting to retain that resource in its existing natural 
state for use as fish and wildlife habitat.’ (Johnson 2016, p. 4).
Indeed political science and economics lead us to expect 
the LAWF, Canterbury Water Management Strategy, the 
Mackenzie Agreement and other collaborative environmental 
governance efforts to work up to a point, but only if participants 
avoid measuring the environmental outcomes and forfeit their 
rights of appeal. In other words, they may work socially, but not 
environmentally, producing a situation in which people agree 
while environmental quality continues to decline. Worse, while 
it might seem a good idea to invite those affected to collaborate 
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in order to come to an agreed solution, this democracy by 
invitation excludes those who do not know they are affected, 
and those who lack the time to participate. Ostrom’s (1990) 
model unabashedly fails to account for effects on outsiders 
such as these, because it assumes a closed system in which 
there are no externalities. In the case of water quality, those 
of us who value the existence of freshwater biodiversity and 
drink tap water are outsiders. Economics and political science 
predict that democracy by invitation risks favouring the strong 
over the weak, the selfish over the selfless, and the bullies over 
everyone else. It contrasts with governance by representative 
democracy through election, which has the potential to include 
the weak, the selfless, and everyone else.
Collaboration, governance, and power
Fish and Game’s exit from the LAWF might not be an 
indictment of collaborative governance itself, but might be 
instead an indictment of an incomplete implementation of 
the model. One oft-levelled criticism is that the Government 
kept decision-making authority for itself, not fulfilling the 
‘governance’ part of the definition. Indeed Johnson said the 
government divided ‘collaboration and governance, and kept 
the governance bit for themselves’ (Johnson quoted in Norris 
2015, p. 6). This echoes Salmon et al. (2008), who said that 
the collaborative model’s success relies on the government’s 
willingness to respect the consensus views of the LAWF (Norris 
2015). Further, media reports of Fish and Game’s exit cite the 
Government’s activities suggesting a pre-existing desire to 
promote irrigation, such as the Government’s establishment of 
the $150 million Irrigation Acceleration Fund in 2008 and its 
stated goal to double primary output by 2025 (Stewart 2015).
In addressing the question of ‘what’s wrong with the 
LAWF?’, optimists and pessimists would probably answer 
differently. Optimistic believers in collaboration would say 
that the LAWF was an incomplete application of a promising 
model. A more complete approach might have worked better and 
kept Fish and Game in the fold. This claim of incompleteness 
is reminiscent of London Review of Books’ description of 
the response of London’s financial centre, called the City, to 
the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, ‘Most City [financial] 
commentators would tell us that … the cure for a problem 
caused by the markets is more reliance on market forces.’ 
(Lanchester 2008, p. 12). Unfortunately, there is still a great 
need for ecological outcomes data to address the question of 
optimism vs. pessimism in LAWF, the Mackenzie Agreement, 
and other such collaborative endeavours; and meta-analyses 
of collaborative governance around the world reveal that such 
data are rarely collected, if ever (Ansell & Gash 2007; Thomas 
2008). Indeed pessimistic sceptics of collaborative governance 
would say the LAWF was doomed from the start by power 
imbalances, displaced and subjugated environmental goals, 
and a fundamental lack of democracy. Such pessimists might 
say Fish and Game was wise to pull out, but would have been 
wiser to pull out sooner.
Nascent optimism?
Although pessimism is warranted, it should not be abject. 
There is room for nascent optimism if, as Ostrom and others 
recommend, there are clear boundaries on possible outcomes of 
the collective process to function as a regulatory ‘backstop’. The 
strength and substance of a backstop affects the desirability of 
collaborative governance. In situations where the backstop is a 
clear and unambiguous threat of a court injunction on resource 
development (such as under the US Endangered Species Act 
1973), collaborative governance within democratically-defined 
limits is the only hope for would-be resource developers. Yet 
if the backstop is New Zealand’s Resource Management Act 
1991, which some argue offers standards that are ‘obscure 
enough to please all parties, vague enough to be unenforceable, 
and so ill-defined that failures to implement the policy will 
be difficult to detect and impossible to litigate’ (Walker et 
al. 2008, p. 226), collaboration in the form of pleading for 
voluntary compliance will be the only option for would-be 
resource regulators (Gunningham 2008). The strength of 
the backstop determines who asks whom to collaborate. A 
weak backstop encourages the regulators to ask the resource 
users, while a strong backstop encourages the users to ask the 
regulators. Thus, the strength of the backstop determines how 
far we should dilute pessimistic predictions that collaborative 
governance will favour development over the environment, 
and insiders over outsiders. 
The National Policy Statement on freshwater, promulgated 
in 2011, might serve to ‘nest’ collaborative water governance 
within a set of regulatory ‘shackles’. Further, on 7 November 
2013, the Government issued a National Objectives Framework 
to guide regional councils in setting freshwater goals (www.
mfe.govt.nz/publications/water/proposed-amendments-nps-
freshwater-management/index.html). The Framework sets 
national bottom-lines, resembling Lowi’s shackles. The 
regional councils will get to decide which non-compliant water 
bodies should be excluded from the bottom-lines and which 
should be forced to comply. It thus appears that the Framework 
is a guide for a goal, not a clear and unambiguous threat of a 
moratorium on abstraction or contamination. Indeed, the key 
to accountability and democracy in collaborative governance 
seems to be the balance between local empowerment and 
central shackles. Ostrom’s nestedness suggests some form of 
mixture could function as a system of checks and balances 
between central government and regional collaborative groups. 
Ideally, a balance would avoid both tyranny at the top and 
capture at the bottom. 
While Ostrom’s nestedness and Lowi’s shackles could 
mitigate the pessimism proposition’s most dire predictions 
about democracy, accountability and fairness, two predictions 
remain which I see no reason to discard: (1) that outcomes 
will favour development over the environment; and (2) that 
outcomes will favour insiders and be unfair to outsiders. 
Although many collaborative efforts purport to avoid a 
‘winner take all’ solution (Ansell & Gash 2007), many still 
create ‘winner take most’ outcomes. The logic of collective 
action (Olson 1965) predicts that the public interest group, no 
matter how numerous, is usually measurably weaker than a 
vested interest group, no matter how small. Thus, the default 
position in any negotiation about the distribution of public 
and private goods – collaborative or not – is that private will 
usually win over public. No matter how well intentioned the 
government officials, well trained the scientists, and altruistic 
the collaborative constituents, the logic of collective action 
predicts that the vested resource development interest will 
usually emerge as the winner who took the most. Although 
Ostrom (1990, 1998) carefully observes and theorises situations 
in which self-interested individuals will cooperate, cooperation 
is no guarantee of an environmentally favourable outcome.
Brower: Collaboration and the environment
Conclusion 
The changing role of government in the environment in New 
Zealand can be seen as a response to the famous Tragedy of 
the Commons, the degradation of the environment expected 
whenever many people pursue their own individual goals in 
a shared environment (Hardin 1968). Both Olson (1965) and 
Hardin (1968) argued that tragedy might be averted by mutual 
coercion to curb self-interest by imposing central regulation 
with strong state intervention; or private ownership and 
management of all resources that would curb public overuse 
in a shared environment because there would be no more 
shared environments. Collective or collaborative governance 
seems to offer a third way, combining the checks of central 
constraints with the balances of community ownership of the 
problem, if not the resource itself. 
There are valid reasons for both optimism and pessimism 
about the future of collaborative environmental governance. 
However, I conclude that the outlook for environmental quality 
in New Zealand under collaborative environmental governance 
is bleak, but perhaps not dismal. There is room for nascent 
optimism if the structure contains sufficient institutional 
nestedness, centralised shackles, and an effective mix of checks 
and balances between national and local interests. However, I 
find no compelling reason to discard the pessimistic predictions 
that collaborative governance will favour development over 
the environment, and insiders over outsiders. 
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